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Abstract
Lindahl equilibrium is an application of price-taking behavior to achieve efficiency in the
allocation of public goods. Such an equilibrium requires individuals to be strategically naive,
i.e., Lindahl equilibrium is not incentive compatible. Correlated equilibrium is defined precisely
to take account of strategic behavior and incentive compatibility. Using the duality theory of
linear programming, we show that these two seemingly disparate notions can be combined to
give a public goods, Lindahl pricing characterization of efficient correlated equilibria. We also
show that monopoly theory can be used to characterize inefficient correlated equilibria.
1 Introduction
A public good is an outcome that is jointly consumed by everyone. Compared to private
goods, duality theory for public goods exhibits the following well-known reversal: Instead of
outcomes that are personalized (different allocations to different individuals) and prices that
are impersonal (the same to all), with public goods the outcome is impersonal, while prices
are personalized. The fact that the prices each individual faces are personalized—and depend
on the individual’s tastes— is evidence of their strategic manipulability, i.e., implicit in the
formulation are incentives to deviate.
∗Thanks to David Rahman for helpful discussions.
†Contact: ostroy@ucla.edu
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For a game in normal form, each individual’s payoff depends on the play of the game. Hence,
a play of the game fits the definition of a public good. A correlated equilibrium (Aumann [1974])
is a (randomized) play from which no individual has an incentive to deviate. Hart and Schmeidler
[1989] and Nau and McCardle [1990] have shown that the existence of correlated equilibrium
can be demonstrated using the duality techniques of linear programming.
The goal of this paper is to integrate the public goods and correlated equilibrium dualities.
First we shall characterize Lindahl equilibrium for a game in normal form without incen-
tive constraints as a linear programming problem. The model can be described as individual
consumers (the players) purchasing the public good (a randomized play of the game) from a
supplier with a zero cost, constant returns to scale technology.
Next, we add the incentive constraints that define correlated equilibrium to the above LP
problem. Their burden falls on the supplier whose technology will, in effect, be reduced by the
imposition of these incentive constraints. A dual consequence is that prices will change from
those characterizing first-best outcomes to prices that take account of strategic behavior. This
leads to a characterization of the second-best, or incentive efficient, correlated equilibrium—
those achieving a maximum weighted sum of payoffs—as Lindahl equilibria for the incentive
constrained model of public goods.
Incentive constrained efficient Lindahl equilibria have the property that the supplier of the
public good is a price-taker earning zero profits. Other correlated equilibria do not share that
property. We focus on worst cases— those correlated equilibria achieving a minimum weighted
sum of payoffs. We characterize such outcomes as equilibria in which the supplier acts as
a monopolist whose goal is to extract as much as possible from his customers by imposing
quantity constraints on their purchases.
Myerson [1991] has described the implementation of correlated equilibria via a mediator. To
summarize our results in these terms, distinguish between a mediator facing competition from
a elastic supply of identical mediators and a mediator for whom there are no substitutes. The
mediator-supplier facing competition will implement a Lindahl equilibrium while a mediator-
supplier without competitors will implement a monopoly equilibrium.
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2 Pricing and efficiency in normal form game
Let A = A1 ×A2 × · · · ×An be the finite set of strategies and
Z(A) = {z ∈ R|A| : z(a) ≥ 0,
∑
a
z(a) = 1}
the set of randomized play of the game. The payoff function for i is vi : A→ R. The utility of
z to i is
vi · z =
∑
a
vi(a)z(a)
Fixing A, a game is defined by v = (v1, . . . , vn).
2.1 A model of public goods
We ignore incentive compatibility in this section and focus on the public good interpretation of
game. Therefore, we are not analyzing a game per se.
The list v can also be regarded as the utility functions of an economic model. For this
interpretation, A will denote an index set of |A| objects, e.g. houses. A distinctive feature of
the analysis in this section is that there is no particular connection between i and Ai. Without
changing notation, extend the definition of vi from A to vi : R|A| → R ∪ {−∞} as
vi(z) =

vi · z if z ∈ Z(A)
−∞ otherwise
Denote by ea ∈ Z(A) the element such that ea(a′) = 0 for all a′ 6= a. The utility function vi
states that i can live in one house or split his “time” among them. In the following, the aim is
to establish an equilibrium in which all individuals choose to live in the same house, or more
generally, the same mixture of houses.1
Let pi : A → R be the (rental) prices charged to i for each a ∈ A. The opportunity to
purchase z yields the indirect utility function
v∗i (pi) = max
z∈Z(A)
{vi · z − pi · z}
The maximization underlying v∗i (pi) presumes that the individual can choose any (mixture of)
a; and, prices are inescapable in that the choice z cannot be separated from the money payment
1The function vi is similar to a buyer’s utility in a commodity representation of the assignment model, e.g. Shapley
and Shubik [1971].
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pi ·z. The function v∗i is the indirect utility or conjugate of vi which describes the preferences of
an individual with quasi-linear utility ui(z,m) = vi·z+m facing a budget constraint pi·z+m = 0.
Introduce a market by adding individual 0, the supplier of z. The supplier’s cost function is
c0(z) =

0 if z ∈ R|A|+
∞ otherwise
Hence, the supplier can costlessly provide any ea or non-negative linear combination thereof.
The supplier’s objective at prices p0 : A→ R is to maximize profits,
sup
z
{p0 · z − c0(z)} = sup
z≥0
{p0 · z} = sup
z(a)≥0
{p0(a)z(a)}.
If we use the sign convention that the output price (input price) is negative (positive), we can
write the supplier’s objective in a similar form to the buyers’ as v∗0(p0) = supz{v0(z) − p0 · z}
where v0(z) = −c0(z).
The hypothesis that the supplier can costlessly provide any non-negative quantities is adopted
to guarantee that profits will be zero in equilibrium. Thus, if profits are maximized at z0,
(1) v∗0(p0) = v0(z0)− p0 · z0 = −p0 · z0 = 0
(2) p0(z) ≥ 0
(3) z0(a) > 0 implies p0(a) = 0.
Formally, v0 : R|A| → {0} ∪ {−∞} is the (concave) indicator function of the cone R|A|+ and
v∗0 : R|A| → {0} ∪ {∞} is its support function. As the support function of a cone, v∗0 is the
(convex) indicator function of the polar cone {p : pz ≤ 0,∀z ∈ R|A|+ }.
Definition 1 A Lindahl equilibrium with transfers for v is a ([zi, pi], z0, p0) such that:
(a) vi(zi)− pi · zi = v∗i (pi) for all i
(b) v0(z0)− p0 · z0 = v∗0(p0)
(c) zi = z0 for all i
(d)
∑
i
pi + p0 = 0.
This price-taking equilibrium satisfies the usual conditions of (a) utility maximization for the
buyers, (b) profit maximization for the supplier, and (c) “market clearance” for public goods in
which the supplier simultaneously supplies z0 to each i while (d) receiving the sum of the prices
paid by the buyers. Conditions (c) and (d) are familiar conditions for Lindahl equilibrium.
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We distinguish between equilibrium with and without money transfers. It was remarked
above that a necessary condition for equilibrium is that the money the supplier receives from
buyers, his profits, should be zero. But, the fact that
∑
i pi · zi = −p · z0 = 0 in equilibrium does
not imply that
(e) pi · zi = 0,∀i.
Definition 2 A Lindahl equilibrium for v is a ([zi, pi], z0, p0) satisfying (a)–(e).
The distinction between equilibrium and equilibrium with transfers is a well-known method of
using the simplifying hypothesis of quasi-linearity, i.e., when transfers are possible, to obtain
results that apply to non-transferable utility models that do not, in fact, require quasi-linearity.
See Shapley (1969). Except when explicitly mentioned otherwise (see Corollary 1, in Section
3.2), Lindahl equilibrium is restricted to Definition 2.
The definition of efficiency, or Pareto-optimality, in v also treats A as an index set, ignoring
the relation between i and Ai.
Definition 3 A z ∈ Z(A) is efficient for v if there is no z′ ∈ Z(A) such that vi · z′ ≥ vi · z for
all i and at least one inequality is strict. Regarding v as an economic model to which a supplier
added, the statement of efficiency is: there exists [(zi), z0] such that (i) zi = z0 for all i and (ii)
zi ∈ Z(A) and there is no [(z′i), z′0] satisfying (i) and (ii) for which utility is at least as large for
all individuals and strictly greater for at least one i.
The utility outcomes in v are
{(v1 · z, v2 · z, . . . , vn · z) : z ∈ Z(A)},
a set that is convex because Z(A) is. Let ∆ = {λ = (λi) : λi ≥ 0,
∑
i λi = 1}. If λ  0, then
any z ∈ Z(A) such that(∑
i
λivi
)
· z = max
z′∈Z(A)
(∑
i
λivi
)
· z′ = max
a
(∑
i
λivi
)
· (a)
is efficient.
If z achieves the above maximum when one or more λi = 0, we can only conclude that z is
weakly efficient, i.e., there is no z′ ∈ Z(A) such that vi · z′ > vi · z for all i. Here we concentrate
on efficient z associated with λ 0.
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Definition 4 An efficient z associated with λ 0 is one that solves
max
z
(∑
i
λivi
)
· z
when λi > 0 for each i.
Efficiency does not require randomization and is consistent with it only if two or more plays
of the game yield the same highest weighted total utility. Because concepts used in section 2.3
will require randomization, efficiency is also described in these terms.
Lindahl equilibrium describes a decentralized way to establish efficiency with public goods.
Theorem 1 [First Welfare Theorem] A Lindahl equilibrium is efficient. [Second Welfare Theo-
rem] For any efficient z associated with λ 0, there are prices pi and p0 such that ([pi, zi], p0, z0)
is a Lindahl equilibrium with z = zi = z0.
2.1.1 Proof of Theorem 1 and Characterization of Welfare Theorems
The existence of Lindahl equilibrium is an application of linear programming in which optimal
solutions to the primal describe the set of efficient z’s and optimal solutions to the dual solution
define Lindahl prices. The primal linear programming (the planner’s problem) is
max
zi,z0
∑
i
λi (vi · zi)
subject to
∑
a
zi(a) = 1, i = 1, . . . , n
zi(a)− z0(a) = 0, ∀a
zi(a), z0(a) ≥ 0
The first constraint states that the mixture of outcomes for each player has to sum to one and
the second constraint states that the choice of each player has to be the same since the outcome
of a game is interpreted as a public good. The third constraint is the mixtures have to be
non-negative. So, the first and the third imply that mixtures are probabilities.
It is known that the (maximization) linear programming has a dual (minimization) linear
programming that achieves the same value as the primal linear programming. The dual linear
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programming (the decentralization) is
min
yi,pi
∑
i
yi
subject to yi ≥ λivi(a)− pi(a), ∀i, a
0 ≥
∑
i
pi(a)
For the characterization of the welfare theorems, we prove a lemma.
Lemma 1 For each λ 0 and an efficient z associated with the λ, there exists a dual solution
such that pi · z = 0 for all i.
Proof. Suppose not, so that pi · zi 6= 0 for some i ∈ I. Define new dual variables as in the
following.
yˆi := yi + pi · zi
pˆi(a) := pi(a)− pi · zi
where z(a) is the optimal solution of the primal.
Then, the first dual constraints are trivially satisfied. For the second dual constraints,
observe that
∑
i pi(a) = 0 at the optimal value of the dual by the fundamental theorem of linear
programming. Therefore,
∑
i pi · z0 =
∑
a
∑
i pi(a)z0(a) = 0; hence, we have∑
i
pˆi(a) =
∑
i
pi(a)−
∑
i
pi · zi =
∑
i
pi(a),
which shows that the second dual constraints hold too.
Moreover, the value of the dual will be the same as before since∑
i
yˆi =
∑
i
yi +
∑
i
pˆi · z =
∑
i
yi
from the constraint for the producer.
Note that p0 ·z = 0 is automatically derived from Lemma 1. After taking an optimal solution
(pi, p0) such that pi · z = 0 and p0 · z = 0, we show how to interpret the dual constraints in
terms of players’ and the supplier’s optimization problems.
Players’ Optimization
yi is the dual variable for individual defined by his probability constraint; hence, it measures
the value of the presence of individual i.
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To illustrate how the first constraints are interpreted as optimization problem of players,
sum the first dual constraints weighted by zi(a) to get
yi ≥ λivi · zi − pi · zi.
By the fundamental theorem of linear programming, if zi were an optimal choice of the primal
linear programming, we have the following.
yi = λivi · zi − pi · zi
Since we have chosen pi so that pi · z = 0, we get yi = λivi · zi. Therefore,
• if pi · zi < 0, i.e. if player i saved some money by trading probability, his choice would not
be optimal since
yi ≥ λivi · zi − pi · zi ≥ λivi · zi.
In other words, player i does not achieve utility level of yi/λi.
• if pi · zi > 0, zi is not feasible to player i.
• if pi · zi = 0, and player i chooses other probability than the optimal probability,
yi ≥ λivi · zi
In other words, player i cannot get more utility by choosing a probability other than the
optimal one solved by the planner.
Therefore, we have shown that the first dual constraints are interpreted as players’ optimization
problems as long as λ 0.
Supplier’s Optimization
For the supplier, by adding the second constraints with a certain probability z0(a), we get
0 ≥
∑
i
pi · z0.
• if z0 /∈ R|A|+ , then the inequality does not hold since the direction of inequality would not
be guaranteed.
• if z0 ∈ R|A|+ , and if the supplier chooses other probability than z,
0 ≥
∑
i
pi · z0.
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In other words, the supplier cannot get more utility by choosing a probability other than
the optimal one solved by the planner.
We have shown that the choice of the supplier is consistent with the planner’s.
Proof of Welfare Theorems
Again by the fundamental theorem of linear programming, the value of the primal and the value
of the dual are the same; hence we proved the second welfare theorem that the planner’s problem
is decentralized by the Lindahl price. The proof of the first welfare theorem also follows from
the proof of the second welfare theorem.
Remark: Note that the decentralization possibility does not depend upon weights λ. In a private
good economy, decentralization without transfer of money among agents is possible only when
weights are carefully chosen. For example, in a two person trade economy with strictly concave
utility functions, only one point on the contract curve can be decentralized without money
transfers. However, in the public goods model, above, the entire frontier can be decentralized.
The second constraint of the primal
zi(a)− z0(a) = 0,∀i,∀a,
makes the individual probability constraints redundant. For example, the value of the primal
would be the same even if we have individual probability constraints only for one individual.
This redundancy implies a considerable degree of freedom in choosing the value of the dual
variables; hence, the entire utility frontier can be decentralized.
[Note to Authors themselves] The crucial reason for decentralization of the entire utility
frontier are: (i) public good situation and (ii) non-existing algebraic structure in the choice set.
2.2 Correlated Equilibrium: Examples
Definition 5 Correlated equilibrium is a probability distribution z0 on set A satisfying the fol-
lowing incentive compatibility conditions∑
a−i
[vi(a−i, di)− vi(a−i, ai)] z0(a) ≤ 0,∀i, ai, di.
Typical interpretation of correlated equilibrium is: (i) there is a randomization device with
probability distribution z0, (ii) when a = (ai)i∈{1,...,n} is realized by the randomization device,
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player i is recommended to play ai without knowing which actions were recommended to other
players. Therefore, the incentive compatibility constraints (divided by
∑
a˜:a˜i=ai
z0(a˜)) describes
that expected utility gain by deviating to di from recommended ai is smaller or equal to zero;
hence, there is no incentive to deviate.
Before formulating a model with the incentive compatibility constraints of correlated equilib-
ria, we present an example showing informally how correlated equilibrium can be decentralized.
Let the game be the following.
b1 b2
a1 5, 1 0, 0
a2 4, 4 1, 5
Here, A = {a1, a2} × {b1, b2} = {(a1, b1), (a1, b2), (a2, b1), (a2, b2)}.
All the possible correlated equilibria are illustrated in terms of payoff in the following graph.
1 2 3 4 5
1
2
3
4
5
A
F
H
v2 z2
v1 z1
The outside quadrangle represents all the possible outcomes by randomization. The inner quad-
rangle represents all the correlated equilibria. Without asymmetric information, efficient allo-
cation when weights on the two players are the same is z(a2, b1) = 1 that can achieve payoff
(4, 4). However, the best correlated equilibrium with the same weights on the two players is A.
We say that A is constrained efficient. Formal definition will follow in section 2.3.
The points A, H, and F can be decentralized by the following prices.
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A H F
Payoffs (10/3, 10/3) (13/6,25/6) (1, 5)
Probability 1/3 01/3 1/3
1/6 0
1/6 2/3
0 0
0 1
Price for 1 5/3 −10/32/3 −7/3
17/6 −13/6
11/6 −7/6 4 −13 0
Price for 2 −49/15 −14/314/15 7/3
−133/30 −35/6
−7/30 7/6
−28/5 −7
−7/5 0
Price for the supplier −8/5 −88/5 0
−8/5 −8
8/5 0
−8/5 −8
8/5 0
Note that the prices are normalized so that the marginal utility of income is 1 for player 1, and
7/5 for player 2. In other words, if any of them were given  amount of money, their utility will
increase by  or 7/5. Also note that the prices are such that the supplier’s profit is zero, i.e.
actuarially fair prices, which could be argued through the competition of the suppliers.
Player i’s problem is
max
zi
vi · zi subject to
∑
a
zi(a) = 1, pi · zi = 0
For pointA, it can be easily verified that (zi(a1, b1), zi(a1, b2), zi(a2, b1), zi(a2, b2)) = (1/3, 0, 1/3, 1/3)
is an optimal solution of player 1. The similar can be shown for point F and H.
The supplier also would choose the same probability as players. For point A, the supplier
wants to sell more (a2, b1) since the profit is higher. However, if she sells more (a2, b1), the
incentive compatibility condition would break. Under the premise that the supplier gets very
large negative utility when she sells incentive non-compatible probability, the supplier would
not sell (a2, b1) more than 1/3 amount. Rigorously, the supplier’s problem is
max
z0
p0 · z0 subject to z0(a) ≥ 0,
∑
a−i
[vi(a−i, di)− vi(a−i, ai)] z0(a) ≤ 0,∀i, ai, di.
It is easily verified that (z0(a1, b1), z0(a1, b2), z0(a2, b1), z0(a2, b2)) = (1/3, 0, 1/3, 1/3) is an op-
timal solution of the supplier. And the similar can be shown for point F and H.
2.3 Correlated equilibrium and public goods
The modeling is the same to that of section 2.1 with the important exception that the supplier
can now sell only those z0 that are incentive compatible. To incorporate that restriction, the
supplier’s cost function is redefined as,
cI0(z) =

0 if z ∈ R|A|+ ,
∑
a−i [vi(a−i, di)− vi(a−i, ai)] z0(a) ≤ 0,∀i, ai, di
∞ otherwise
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So the supplier’s maximization problem is
(b′) max
z0
p0 · z0 − CI0 (z).
Definition 6 A Lindahl equilibrium of correlated equilibrium game for v is a ([zi, pi], z0, p0)
satisfying (a), (b′), and (c)–(e).
Define the set of incentive feasible probabilities for each i
Ci(A) := {z : ∀di,
∑
a−i
[vi(a−i, di)− vi(a−i, ai)] z(a) ≤ 0}.
The set of incentive feasible probabilities is therefore,
C(A) := ∩i∈ICi(A).
The definition of constrained efficiency under the asymmetric information is stated.
Definition 7 An incentive compatible z ∈ Z(A) ∩ C(A) is constrained efficient for v if there
is no incentive compatible z′ ∈ Z(A) ∩ C(A) such that vi · z′ ≥ vi · z for all i and at least
one inequality is strict. Regarding v as an economic model to which a supplier added, the
statement of constrained efficiency is: there exists [(zi), z0] such that (i) zi = z0 for all i and
(ii) zi ∈ Z(A)∩C(A), and there is no [(z′i), z′0] satisfying (i) and (ii) for which utility is at least
as large for all individuals and strictly greater for at least one i.
Lindahl equilibrium of correlated equilibrium game describes a decentralized way to establish
constrained efficiency with games.
Theorem 2 [First Welfare Theorem] A Lindahl equilibrium of correlated equilibrium game is
efficient. [Second Welfare Theorem] For any efficient z associated with λ 0, there are prices
pi and p0 such that ([pi, zi], p0, z0) is a Lindahl equilibrium of correlated equilibrium game with
z = zi = z0.
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2.3.1 Proof of Theorem 2 and Characterization of Welfare Theorems
The primal linear programming (the planner’s problem) is
max
zi,z0
∑
i
λi (vi · zi)
subject to
∑
a
zi(a) = 1, i = 1, . . . , n
zi(a)− z0(a) = 0, ∀a
λi
∑
a−i
[vi(a−i, di)− vi(a−i, ai)] z0(a) ≤ 0,∀i, ai, di
zi(a), z0(a) ≥ 0
The first constraint states that the probability allocation of outcomes for each player has to sum
to one. The second constraint states that the probability choice of each player has to be the
same since the outcome of a game is interpreted as a public good. The third is the incentive
compatibility constraint. Note that z0(a) was used instead of zi(a) for the incentive compatibility
constraints so that the supplier bears the cost of the incentive compatibility constraints.
The dual linear programming (the decentralization) is
min
yi,pi
∑
i
yi
subject to yi ≥ λivi(a)− pi(a), ∀i, a
0 ≥
∑
i
pi(a)−
∑
i
λi
∑
di
[vi(a−i, di)− vi(a−i, ai)]αi(di|ai),∀a
αi(di|ai) ≥ 0
The dual programming is identical to that of section 2.1 except for the last term of the second
dual constraint.
For the characterization of the welfare theorems, we prove a lemma.
Lemma 2 For each λ 0 and an efficient z associated with the λ, there exists a dual solution
such that pi · z = 0 for all i.
Proof. Identical to that of Lemma 1
Note that po ·z = 0 is automatically derived from Lemma 2. After taking an optimal solution
(pi, p0) such that pi · z = 0 and p0 · z = 0, we show how to interpret the dual constraints in
terms of players’ and the supplier’s optimization problems.
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Players’ Optimization
Identical to that of Section 2.1.1.
Supplier’s Optimization
We prove a lemma that will be useful to interpret the second constraints as the supplier’s
optimization problem.
Lemma 3 If z0(a) is incentive compatible,∑
a
∑
i
λi
∑
di
[vi(a−i, di)− vi(a−i, ai)]αi(di|ai)z0(a) ≤ 0
Moreover, if z0(a) is an optimal solution of the primal, the inequality is equality.
Proof. From the incentive compatibility constraints, we conclude∑
i
λi
∑
di
∑
ai
∑
a−i
[vi(a−i, di)− vi(a−i, ai)]αi(di|ai)z0(a)
=
∑
i
λi
∑
ai
∑
di
αi(di|ai)
∑
a−i
[vi(a−i, di)− vi(a−i, ai)] z0(a)
 ≤ 0
Moreover, by the fundamental theorem of linear programming, we have
λi
∑
a−i
[vi(a−i, di)− vi(a−i, ai)] z0(a)αi(di|ai) = 0,
which implies equality. Therefore, the result follows.
The supplier’s optimization problem is illustrated by the following inequalities
0 ≥
∑
i
pi · z0 −
∑
a
∑
i
λi
∑
di
[vi(a−i, di)− vi(a−i, ai)]αi(di|ai)z0(a), (∗∗)
which are derived by adding the second constraints with a certain probability z0(a). By the
fundamental theorem of linear programming and Lemma 3, if z0 were an optimal choice of the
primal linear programming, we have
0 =
∑
i
pi · z0.
Therefore,
• if z0 ∈ R|A|+ but z0 /∈ C, then z0 is infeasible to the supplier.
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• if z0 ∈ R|A|+ and z0 ∈ C, then z0 does not increase the supplier’s profit by the following
inequalities derived from Lemma 3.
0 ≥
∑
i
pi · z0 −
∑
a
∑
i
λi
∑
di
[vi(a−i, di)− vi(a−i, ai)]αi(di|ai)z0(a) ≥
∑
i
pi · z0
In other words, the supplier cannot get more utility by choosing a probability other than
the optimal one solved by the planner.
We have shown that the choice of the supplier is consistent with the planner’s.
Again by the fundamental theorem of linear programming, the value of the primal and the
value of the dual are the same; hence we proved the second welfare theorem that the planner’s
problem is decentralized by the Lindahl price. As in the last section, we also get the result that
the decentralization is always possible for any weights λ 0 as was in the case without incentive
compatibility constraints. The proof of the first welfare theorem follows from the proof of the
second welfare theorem.
3 Monopolistic supplier of CE
In Section 2, we characterized the best correlated equilibria by Lindahl pricing; hence, proved
the welfare theorems. In the classical monopoly problem, it is known that the efficient outcome
is not obtained since the monopolist does not behave as a price-taker.
The environment that the classical monopolist is situated in is characterized by the fol-
lowings: (i) she is the sole producer, and (ii) her ability to price discriminate is constrained.
Therefore, (iii) she ends up with producing inefficient quantity. Note that, if she was not con-
strained to put uniform price to consumers, she produces efficient quantity, and extracts all the
gains from production by setting prices equal to consumers utilities.
For an analogy to the above observation, we let a monopolistic supplier of correlated equi-
librium to be situated in where (i) she is the sole supplier, and (ii) her ability to set price is
limited by a regulation that will be described in the below. Therefore, (iii) she ends up with
suppling inefficient correlated equilibrium. If her ability to set price is not constrained by a
regulation, she will implement efficient correlated equilibrium, and will extract all the surplus
from the players.
Without assumption of quasi-linear utility, it is impossible for the monopolist to extract
money from the consumers as in the classical monopolist problem. So, we will assume that
players’ utility functions are quasi-linear.
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Formally, player i’s utility function is
vi · zi − pi · zi.
where pi · zi is money expenditure. Also, money cannot be used for incentive compatibility
constraints, i.e. incentive compatibility constraints remain the same, i.e.∑
a−i
[vi(a−i, di)− vi(a−i, ai)] z0(a) ≤ 0,∀i, ai, di.
We also assume individual rationality of players in the sense that monopolist cannot extract too
much from the consumer.
Assumption 1 (Individual Rationality) Monopolist cannot extract too much so that play-
ers’ payoff becomes negative, i.e.
vi · zi − pi · zi ≥ 0.
So, monopolist’s problem without constraint on price is
max
pi,z0
∑
i
pi · z0 − cI0(z0)
s.t. z0 ∈ argmax
zi:
P
a zi(a)=1
vi · zi − pi · zi
vi · zi − pi · zi ≥ 0
We illustrate by an example how a monopolist without any constraint on price implements
efficient correlated equilibrium, and extracts all the surplus from the players.
Example 1 Let the game be the following.
b1 b2
a1 5, 1 0, 0
a2 4, 4 1, 5
The following is zero profit price for the monopolist to implement the best correlated equilibrium.
Payoffs Probability Price for 1 Price for 2 Price for the monopolist
(10/3, 10/3) 1/3 01/3 1/3
5/3 −5/3
2/3 −7/3
−7/3 −5/3
2/3 5/3
−2/3 −10/3
4/3 −2/3
It is trivial that the price implements the correlated equilibrium.
However, the monopolist will set price as in the following, and extracts 20/3 = 10/3 + 10/3.
Payoffs Probability Price for 1 Price for 2 Price for the monopolist
(0, 0) 1/3 01/3 1/3
15/3 5/3
12/3 3/3
3/3 5/3
12/3 15/3
18/3 10/3
24/3 18/3
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In other words, monopolist will simply increase the price implementing the efficient correlated
equilibrium by 10/3 for each of the players. Note that, if the monopolist implements less effi-
cient correlated equilibrium, the amount that she can extract diminish. Therefore, she always
implements the best correlated equilibrium.
The intuition comes from the classical monopolist’s problem: the classical monopolist with
price discrimination implements efficient quantity in terms of social welfare, then extract all the
surplus from the consumer by charging higher prices.
3.1 The monopolist’s problem
If the classical monopolist loses freedom to charge different prices, she implements less efficient
outcome, i.e. monopoly outcome. In the current context of correlated equilibrium, if the mo-
nopolistic correlated equilibrium supplier faces a constraint restricting certain prices, she would
implement less efficient correlated outcome. The following assumption is one that restricts the
freedom of price setting.
Assumption 2 Let
(
pAFi (a; z)
)
a∈A be actuarially fair prices for correlated equilibrium z, i.e.
prices that gives zero profit for the monopolist. Define pi(z) = maxa pAFi (a; z). The monopolist
cannot price any outcome a at more than (1+β)pi(z), i.e. pi(a) ≤ (1+β)pi(z) for given β > 0.
The assumption can be rationalized as ‘minimal consumer protection’, where a regulator limits
“mark-up” not to be more than β. Therefore, parameter β measures the strictness of the
regulation. If β is too high, the regulation would not be meaningful, so implemented correlated
equilibrium will be the best one, and the monopolist will extract all the surplus.
Formally, monopolist’s problem with constraint on price is
max
pi,z0
∑
i
pi · z0 − cI0(z0)
s.t. z0 ∈ argmax
zi:
P
a zi(a)=1
vi · zi − pi · zi
vi · zi − pi · zi ≥ 0
pi(a) ≤ (1 + β)pi(z0)
Unlike a price-taker who chooses only quantity, a monopolist chooses price and quantity. Con-
sequently, the monopolist’s problem is non-linear.
An example illustrates how the monopolist implements less efficient correlated equilibrium.
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Example 2 Again, let the game be the following.
b1 b2
a1 5, 1 0, 0
a2 4, 4 1, 5
All the possible correlated equilibria are illustrated in terms of payoff in the following graph.
1 2 3 4 5
1
2
3
4
5
A
B
C
D
v2 z2
v1 z1
Actuarially fair prices, payoffs, and probabilities for each correlated equilibrium are the follow-
ings.
A B C D
Payoffs (10/3, 10/3) (3,3) (2.5, 2.5) (2,2)
Probability 1/3 01/3 1/3
1/2 0
0 1/2
1/4 1/4
1/4 1/4
1/3 1/3
0 1/3
Price for 1 5/3 −5/32/3 −7/3
2 −3
1 −2
5/2 −5/2
3/2 −3/2
3 −2
2 −1
Price for 2 −7/3 −5/32/3 5/3 −2 −31 2
−3/2 −5/2
3/2 5/2
−1 −2
2 3
Price for the supplier −2/3 −10/34/3 −2/3 0 −62 0 1 −53 1 2 −44 2
We make three observations.
1: Except at point A that is on the utility frontier, the supplier is not selling the optimal
probability under the given prices. For example, at point B, the supplier coulud sell more
of (a2, b1) to increase profit. The monopolist in the classical monopoly model limits the
quantity of production to increase the price, we argue that the monopolist in our model
limits the probability in a certain way to raise the prices. Detailed illustration will follow
after the observations.
2: By shifting up the prices for the player by , the monopolist can make player i to choose the
same z0; hence, incentive compatibility would be preserved.
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3: The prices for (a1, b1) are increasing as players’ utilities from the game decrease (from A
to D). This is not coincidence. From the dual constraint, we had
vi · z0 = yi = vi(a)− pi(a), if z0(a) > 0.
Therefore, as yi (expected utility) increases pi(a) decreases. As a matter of fact, the prices
were chosen to satisfy the above equality even when a is not in the support of z0.
Now let us illustrate how a monopolist regulated by Assumption 2 extracts money from players.
Let β = 0.5. At point A, the pMi (z) = 5/3 for both players. The highest price that the monopolist
can charge is (1 + β) 53 =
5
2 . Therefore, the amount of money that the monopolist can extract is
at most 5/2 − 5/3 = 5/6 by increasing all the prices pi(a) by 5/6. At point B, the monopolist
can charge up to 2(1+β) = 3; hence, she can extract up to 3−2 = 1. Eventually, the monopolist
will implement correlated equilibrium D with the following prices and probability.
Prob. AF Price for 1 AF Price for 2 Price for 1 Price for 2 Revenue
1/3 1/3
0 1/3
3 −2
2 −1 −1 −21 3 4.5 −0.53.5 0.5 0.5 −0.53.5 4.5 5 −17 5
Hence, the profit is 1/3 · 5 + 1/3 · 5 + 1/3 · (−1) = 3. The utility each player gets is (1/3 · 5 +
1/3 · 1 + 1/3 · 0) − (1/3 · 4.5 + 1/3 · 0.5 + 1/3 · (−0.5)) = 0.5. Note that individual rationality
condition is not binding in this example.
For simplicity of exposition, we ignore individual rationality condition for the time being,
and state the main theorem. In the Section 3.3, we illustrate how individual rationality interacts
with Assumption 2.
Theorem 3 The monopolist chooses the worst correlated equilibrium.
Proof. See Section 3.2
3.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Player i’s optimization can be represented by the following.
vi(a)− pi(a)− ρi ≤ 0, equality if zi(a) > 0∑
z0(a) = 1
where ρi is the multiplier of the probability constraint.
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It is without loss of generality to have
vi(a)− pi(a)− ρi = 0,∀a
since the monopolist can set pi(a) lower to make the equality hold even when a is not on the
support of the correlated equilibrium that the monopolist wants to set. Because the utility
function is linear, player i would choose the correlated equilibrium that the monopolist wants
to implement.
Adding the FOC with weight z0(a) that the monopolist wants to implement, we get
vi · z0 − pi · z0 − ρi = 0
Therefore,
ρi = vi · z0 − pi · z0 = vi(a)− pi(a),∀a ∈ A
Actuarially fair price is defined as the zero profit prices for the monopolist. Therefore,
actuarially fair price p˜i(a) is defined by
vi(a)− p˜i(a) = ρi = vi · z0 − p˜i · z0 = vi · z0
For the regulation of Assumption 2, we derive
pi(a) ≤ (1 + β)pi(z) = (1 + β)max
a
p˜i(a)
= (1 + β)max
a
[vi(a)− vi · z0] = (1 + β)
[
max
a
[vi(a)]− vi · z0
]
(∗ ∗ ∗)
Therefore, the program is equivalent to
max
pi,z0
∑
i
pi · z0
s.t. vi · z0 − pi · z0 = vi(a)− pi(a)∑
z0(a) = 1
pi(a) ≤
[
max
a
[vi(a)]− vi · z0
]
(1 + β)∑
a−i
[vi(a−i, di)− vi(a−i, ai)] z0(a) ≤ 0,∀i, ∀ai,∀di
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By substituting Ii = pi · z0 into the objective function and the first constraint, we get
max
pi,z0,Ii
∑
i
Ii
s.t. vi · z0 − Ii = vi(a)− pi(a)
Ii = pi · z0∑
z0(a) = 1
pi(a) ≤
[
max
a
[vi(a)]− vi · z0
]
(1 + β)∑
a−i
[vi(a−i, di)− vi(a−i, ai)] z0(a) ≤ 0,∀i,∀ai,∀di
However, the second constraint is redundant since it can be derived from the first and the
third constraints by adding the first constraints with weight z0(a). Therefore, we get a linear
programming formulation.
max
pi,z0,Ii
∑
i
Ii
s.t. vi · z0 − Ii = vi(a)− pi(a)∑
z0(a) = 1
pi(a) ≤
[
max
a
[vi(a)]− vi · z0
]
(1 + β)∑
a−i
[vi(a−i, di)− vi(a−i, ai)] z0(a) ≤ 0,∀i,∀ai,∀di
• (Step 1) For given correlated equilibrium z0, Ii = β [maxa[vi(a)]− vi · z0] and
pi(a) := vi(a)− vi · z0 + Ii are optimal.
The first constraint is satisfied by the choice of pi(a). The second constraint is also satisfied
since z0 is a probability. The fourth is also satisfied since z0 is a correlated equilibrium.
The third constraint is also satisfied by the following.
pi(a) = vi(a)− vi · z0 + Ii = vi(a)− vi · z0 + β
[
max
a˜
vi(a˜)− vi · z0
]
≤ (1 + β)
[
max
a˜
vi(a˜)− vi · z0
]
.
Also, the third constraint is binding for a ∈ argmax
a˜
vi(a˜). It is impossible to increase Ii
more without breaking any constraints; hence, the optimum is achieved.
• (Step 2) The worst equilibrium z0 (in the sense that
∑
i vi ·z0 is minimized with
incentive compatibility constraint) is an optimal solution to the monopolist’s
program with Ii = β [maxa[vi(a)]− vi · z0] and pi(a) := vi(a)− vi · z0 + Ii.
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The objective function of the monopolist is
∑
i
Ii = β
[∑
i
max
a
[vi(a)]−
∑
i
vi · z0
]
= β
∑
i
max
a
[vi(a)]− β
∑
i
vi · z0
Therefore, the optimality is shown.
3.3 Individual Rationality Condition – Revisited
For the monopolist without constraint on price setting, individual rationality condition was
introduced as a mean to deter the monopolist to extract infinite amount of welfare from the
players. Under Assumption 2, infinite amount of welfare extraction is already impossible because
of condition (∗ ∗ ∗), i.e. there is upper bound for price.
For the game that payoff of each outcome is high enough as in Example 2, individual ratio-
nality is not binding. Individual rationality matters only when payoff for some outcome is close
to zero or negative as in the following example.
Example 3 Let the game be the following.
b1 b2
a1 3,−1 −2,−2
a2 2, 2 −1, 3
Each player’s payoff shifted down by 2 from Example 2. Let β = 0.5.
The following price is actuarially fair.
Payoffs Probability Price for 1 Price for 2 Price for the monopolist
(1, 1) 1/2 00 1/2
2 −3
1 −2 −2 −31 2 0 −62 0
We show that the following correlated equilibrium is a solution of the monopolist.
Payoffs Probability Price for 1 Price for 2 Price for the monopolist
(0, 0) 1/2 00 1/2
3 −2
2 −1 −1 −22 3 2 −44 2
Since payoff is 0, individual rationality constraints are binding. Also note that condition of the
regulation is binding too, i.e.
3 = p1(a1, b1) = (1 + β)max
(a˜,b˜)
p1(a˜, b˜) = (1 + β)p1(a1, b1) = 3,
3 = p2(a2, b2) = (1 + β)max
(a˜,b˜)
p2(a˜, b˜) = (1 + β)p2(a2, b2) = 3.
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Therefore, if there is a way to increase profit more, it must be by increasing vi · zi. However, if
it is done, pi(a) has to decrease further because of
pi(a) ≤
[
max
a
[vi(a)]− vi · z0
]
(1 + β)
Considering condition
vi · z0 − Ii = vi(a)− pi(a)⇔ Ii = vi · z0 − vi(a) + pi(a)
the profit cannot go up since increase in vi · z is dwarfed by decrease in pi(a) that Ii decreases.
When individual rationality is binding, worst correlated equilibrium is (typically) not imple-
mented. Formally, let us add individual rationality condition back to the monopolist’s problem
in Section 3.2. If individual rationality is not binding, we are done. If individual rationality
does not hold, we have to decrease pi(a) since
vi · z0 − Ii = vi(a)− pi(a).
Now condition pi(a) ≤ [maxa[vi(a)]− vi · z0] (1 + β) is relaxed. By increasing vi · z0, we make
it tighter again. This procedure of binding the constraint is beneficial to the monopolist since
she can extract larger Ii considering vi · z0 − Ii = vi(a)− pi(a). Therefore, we have shown that
a correlated equilibrium better than the worst one is (typically2) implemented when individual
rationality is binding.
Proposition 1 When individual rationality condition is binding, correlated equilibrium (typi-
cally) better than the worst one is implemented by the monopolist.
We also note a relationship between β and vi · z0.
Proposition 2 When individual rationality condition is binding,
β =
maxa[vi(a)]
maxa[vi(a)]− vi · z0 − 1
Proof. For at least one a, pi(a) = (1 + β) [maxa˜ vi(a˜)− vi · z0]. Because of vi · z0 − Ii =
vi(a)− pi(a), we have
vi(a)− vi · z0 + Ii = (1 + β) [vi(a)− vi · z0]
⇒ 1 + β = vi(a)− vi · z0 + Ii
vi(a)− vi · z0 = 1 +
Ii
vi(a)− vi · z0
⇒ β = Ii
vi(a)− vi · z0 =
vi(a)
vi(a)− vi · z0 − 1 because of vi · z0 − pi · z0 = 0
2There are rare cases that individual rationality is binding, and the worst correlated equilibrium is implemented.
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for a ∈ argmax
a˜
vi(a˜).
Therefore, stricter regulation (smaller β) means worse correlated equilibrium from Proposi-
tion 2. However, note that when β = 0, the monopolist is indifferent between any correlated
equilibrium since she cannot extract any surplus because of the regulation.
References
[1] Aumann, R. J., “Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies,” Journal of Math-
ematical Economics 1: 67-96 (1974)
[2] Hart, S., and D. Schmeidler, “Existence of Correlated Equilibria,” Mathematics of Opera-
tions Research 14: 18-25 (1989)
[3] Myerson, R. B., “Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict,” Harvard University Press (1991)
[4] Nau, R. F., and K. F. McCardle, “Coherent Hehavior in Noncooperative Games,” Journal
of Economic Theory 50: 424-444 (1990)
[5] Shapley, L. S., “Utility Comparison and the Theory of Games”, La Decision: 251-263, Paris:
Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. (1969) (Reprinted on pp.307-319
of The Shapley Value (Alvin E. Roth, ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989)
[6] Shapley, L. S. and M. Shubik, “The assignment game I: the core,” International Journal
of Game Theory 1: 111-130 (1971)
24
